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This paper considers the eﬀects of strategic substitutabilities on performance
and incentives in venture capital ﬁnancing. The analysis points to a subtle
link between two pivotal roles of venture capitalists: (i) monitoring ventures
and setting performance incentives, and (ii) coordinating and shaping the prod-
uct market strategies of ventures operating in similar product spaces. When
strategic substitutabilities are strong, the VC’s role is to soften potentially
too aggressive product market strategies. In contrast, small strategic substi-
tutabilities can lead to more aggressive performance incentives. This is because
they enhance the VC’s commitment to weed out losers, which strengthens en-
trepreneurial incentives and results in overall eﬃciency gains. We discuss our
ﬁndings in light of case study evidence from the venture capital industry.
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1Cannibalization & Incentives in Venture Financing
Executive Summary
Venture capital organizations frequently devote their funding and coaching activities
to ﬁrms that operate in similar product spaces. For example, Kleiner & Perkins,
a US venture capital ﬁrm, backed many of today’s smaller players in the optical
networking equipment sector. In fact, Kleiner & Perkins created an optical net-
working supply chain by investing in component makers, equipment makers (who
source from the former), and ﬁnal customers of optical networking gear, i.e. ex-
change carriers. The strategic role of synergy eﬀects/complementarities in venture
capital ﬁnancing received much attention among both practitioners and the research
community. Yet, interrelationships between a VC’s portfolio ﬁrms are not conﬁned
to complementarities. VC organizations frequently back ﬁrms that operate in the
same horizontal space, address similar needs, and ﬁght for the same budgets. Com-
ing back to the example of Kleiner & Perkins, within horizontal segments of the
networking supply chain, ﬁrms are often best described as being actual or potential
competitors. The role of strategic substitutabilities has received much less attention
in the literature. This paper presents a framework that not only allows to address
the role of strategic substitutabilities in venture capital ﬁnancing and their eﬀects
on venture performance and incentives, but also to explain why VC organizations
fund actual or potential competitors of already existing portfolio ﬁrms.
The analysis points to a subtle link between two pivotal roles of venture capi-
talists: (i) monitor portfolio ﬁrms and set strong performance incentives, and (ii)
coordinate and shape the product market strategies of portfolio ﬁrms operating in
similar product market spaces. Our ﬁndings suggest that in the presence of very
strong strategic substitutabilities (two ventures being subject to intense competi-
tion in the product market), the VC’s role is to soften the potential product mar-
ket aggressiveness of portfolio ﬁrms. This superior internalization of competitive
externalities creates value by avoiding excessive cannibalization and shifting rents
from customers to portfolio ﬁrms. More intriguingly, however, we also show that
small strategic substitutabilities can lead to more aggressive performance incentives.
When a VC is invested in a competitor of a portfolio ﬁrm, he is more determined
to cut down reﬁnancing should the portfolio ﬁrm show poor performance: strategic
substitutabilities help to weed out losers (conversely, if a venture brought strong
synergies to other portfolio ﬁrms, the VC might be hesitant to cut down the ven-
ture following poor performance as he would lose the strategic beneﬁts conveyed by
1the venture). The VC’s superior commitment to weed out losers strengthens the
incentives of entrepreneurs to perform more aggressively. This is because when tak-
ing poor decisions and putting little entrepreneurial eﬀort, entrepreneurs are very
likely to see their ventures terminated. Entrepreneurs thus have stronger incentives
to perform, which is beneﬁcial whenever strategic substitutabilities are small (and
entrepreneurs must be incentivized to perform). In case of strong substitutabili-
ties, aggressive performance hurts other portfolio ﬁrms too much: entrepreneurial
performance incentives should be softened, rather than strengthened.
We confront these ﬁndings with a detailed case study of Kleiner & Perkins’ in-
vestment activities in the networking equipment space. The case study evidence
suggests that Kleiner & Perkins’ portfolio ﬁrms in this space are frequently best de-
scribed as being actual or potential competitors. Typically, however, the ventures’
respective product oﬀerings display some degree of product diﬀerentiation. This
suggests that the case of small strategic substitutabilities is most relevant. Fur-
thermore, Kleiner & Perkins’ portfolio ﬁrms are in most cases relatively successful
players in their respective market segments. For example, Ciena became a leader
in the market for optical switches relying on electrical regeneration of light signals
through its acquisition of Lightera, a Kleiner & Perkins’ portfolio ﬁrm. Ciena com-
petes against Corvis, a Kleiner & Perkins backed maker of all–optical switches, and
ﬁrst mover and leader in this segment. These observations are consistent with our
ﬁnding that strategic substitutabilities can lead to stronger (and thus more aggres-
sive) performance incentives. The case study also reveals that Kleiner & Perkins
frequently holds on to its portfolio investments: even long after an IPO and the
expiry of IPO lock–up provisions does Kleiner & Perkins hold on to (albeit small)
stakes in portfolio ﬁrms. This pattern is consistent with the idea that a VC may
want to retain a stake in a portfolio ﬁrm to gain a competitive advantage in coach-
ing and incentivizing an entrepreneur who operates in the same space and addresses
similar needs as the previously funded portfolio ﬁrm.
In sum, the ﬁndings of this paper suggest that in funding situations where
coaching, monitoring, and providing performance incentives matter, strategic sub-
stitutabilities help to set incentives and to improve venture performance. Venture
capital organizations thus should not leave the ﬁnancing of ﬁrms that may compete
against their own portfolio ﬁrms to their competitors, they should ﬁnance these
ﬁrms themselves. However, the eﬀectiveness of this strategy will be limited by the
extent to which venture capital organizations can commit not to opportunistically
channel proprietary knowledge from one portfolio ﬁrm to another. This suggests
that such practice is conﬁned to the most reputable and established venture capital
organizations.
21 Introduction
Venture capital (VC) organizations typically devote their funding and coaching ac-
tivities to a small number of industries and technologies. For example, Kleiner &
Perkins, a US venture capital ﬁrm, backed many of today’s smaller companies in the
optical networking equipment space. In fact, Kleiner & Perkins created an optical
networking supply chain by investing in optical component makers, optical equip-
ment makers (who source from component makers), and ﬁnal customers, such as
exchange carriers. This is consistent with Kleiner & Perkins’ keiretsu approach to
venture ﬁnancing. The underlying idea of this approach is that building a network
of ventures that complement each other helps to create value. Yet, a closer look at
Kleiner & Perkins’ networking keiretsu reveals that Kleiner & Perkins did not only
back companies along the vertical dimension, but also within horizontal segments
of the supply chain. This frequently involved the backing of an actual or potential
competitor of a previously launched portfolio ﬁrm.1
Such practice is not conﬁned to Kleiner & Perkins’ investments in the networking
equipment space. Industry examples suggest that VC organizations regularly ﬁnance
competitors of their existing portfolio ﬁrms. For instance, Sequoia Capital backed
PMC Sierra, Applied Micro Circuits, and Vitesse Semiconductor, three of the four
major players in the market for communication chips.2 Kleiner & Perkins ﬁnanced
E.piphany and Brio Technology, two competitors in the market for e–business an-
alytics software.3 Among the portfolio ﬁrms of Focus Ventures are Allegis, Agile,
and SeeCommerce, three supply– and demand–chain management software makers
with similar product oﬀerings. Integral Capital Partners backed several competitors
in the market for Ethernet switches and routers, such as Extreme Networks and
Riverstone Networks.4 Integral also invested in the previously mentioned software
makers E.piphany, Brio Technology, and a third competitor, Informatica.5
These observations are puzzling. Why would a VC ﬁnance a venture that would
compete against his own portfolio ﬁrms? Equivalently, why do entrepreneurs accept
to be backed by investors who fund actual or potential competitors? More im-
portantly, what are the consequences of strategic substitutabilities between a VC’s
1Section 5 provides a detailed case study of Kleiner & Perkins’ investment activities in the
networking equipment space.
2The fourth player in the market is Broadcom.
3The ﬁrst investments in Brio and E.piphany were made in May 1995 and January 1998, respec-
tively, the two companies went public in May 1998 and September 1999 (see Kleiner & Perkins’
website, http://www.kpcb.com). As of April and July 2000, Kleiner & Perkins had a 12% stake in
E.piphany and a 6% stake in Brio (see the companies’ April and July 2000 proxy ﬁlings). As for
the two companies being competitors, see Brio’s September 2000 10–K ﬁling.
4Other Integral backed equipment makers in this space include Alantec, Whitetree, and Lantern
Communications. See Lightreading at http://www.lightreading.com for a description of the com-
petitive landscape of the Ethernet equipment market.
5For a list of Informatica’s main competitors, see its 2000 10–K report.
3portfolio ﬁrms for incentives and venture performance? In particular, would an en-
trepreneur’s product market actions be softened when backed by a VC who has a
stake in a venture the entrepreneur would compete with? Or are there instances
when the entrepreneur would compete more aggressively, relative to ﬁnancing by an
independent VC?
This paper presents a formal framework that allows to address these questions.
The framework elaborates on the ﬁnancing relationship between an entrepreneur
and a VC who holds a stake in a portfolio ﬁrm the entrepreneur would compete
with. The VC’s role is to provide funding and to monitor the entrepreneur’s ac-
tions. Conversely, the entrepreneur’s contribution is to work hard, i.e. to provide
eﬀort. By expending eﬀort, the entrepreneur ensures that her venture will be suc-
cessful. At the same time, however, she will exert a negative externality on the
previously launched portfolio ﬁrm. The novel contribution of this paper is to high-
light how the strategic substitutabability between the two ventures channels into
the entrepreneur’s incentives to perform by altering the VC’s incentives and ability
to provide tough or soft entrepreneurial incentive schemes.
We show that, in some cases, the VC will ﬁnance the venture in order to prevent
the entrepreneur from seeking ﬁnance elsewhere and to soften her product market
aggressiveness. This enables the VC to control the entrepreneur and to align her
incentives with his own interests. In many other cases, however, the VC will ratio-
nally back the venture even though the entrepreneur would have been less aggressive
if ﬁnanced by an independent VC. In other words, the VC willingly cannibalizes his
own portfolio ﬁrm. The intuition is that the VC’s stake in the previously launched
venture gives him a competitive advantage in incentivizing an actual or potential
competitor of the venture. This is because the stake in the incumbent venture
conveys the VC with superior commitment to cut down reﬁnancing should the en-
trepreneur perform poorly. In contrast, under independent VC ﬁnancing, a threat
to cut down reﬁnancing may lack credibility as an independent VC has too much
to lose and too little to gain from terminating the venture. A stake in a competing
venture allows to restore the credibility of a termination threat and hence to com-
mit the entrepreneur to work harder. At the same time, however, the VC would not
have excessive incentives to cut down the venture in order to protect his previously
launched portfolio ﬁrm. This is because the VC not only has something to gain
from terminating the venture, but also something to lose, namely his ﬁnancial claim
in the venture. In other words, a stake in a competing ﬁrm gives an additional
degree of freedom which allows to optimize the balance between excessive and too
soft incentives to cut down reﬁnancing.
Results depend critically on the strength of the negative externality the en-
trepreneur imposes on the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm. When the strategic substitutability
between the two ventures is very small, then there is neither a reason to soften
the entrepreneur’s product market actions (her eﬀort level) nor a means to make
her work harder. This is because the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level is still above the
distorted eﬀort level under independent VC ﬁnancing, but termination threats are
4not yet eﬀective. If the negative externality imposed on the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm is
neither too small nor too large, the entrepreneur will be more aggressive than under
independent VC ﬁnancing. In this case, the VC holds a tough claim in the venture.
In particular, the VC is equipped with strong termination rights. If the negative
externality becomes larger, the VC will take a soft equity–like claim in the venture,
essentially, in order to prevent the entrepreneur from working too hard (which would
severely undermine the competitive stance of the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm).
The analysis thus points to several novel implications: (i) Seeking funding from
a VC who is invested in an actual or potential competitor can be value–enhancing
for an entrepreneur. Similarly, a VC may have strong incentives to back a venture
that operates in the same space, addresses similar needs, and may even become a
competitor of an existing portfolio ﬁrm; (ii) relative to independent VC ﬁnancing, the
entrepreneur may act more aggressively if backed by the competitor–aﬃliated VC.
This is because the VC’s stake in the competitor enhances his ability to incentivize
the entrepreneur; (iii) the VC may want to retain a stake in a portfolio ﬁrm, even
after the ﬁrm’s IPO, in order to enhance his competitive advantage in ﬁnancing
related, potentially competing ventures.
We confront the analysis with a case study of the investment activities of Kleiner
& Perkins in the networking equipment space. The case study suggests that (i)
Kleiner & Perkins indeed backed actual or potential competitors of previously funded
portfolio ﬁrms, while still being invested in these ﬁrms; (ii) Kleiner & Perkins played
no role in softening competition. To the contrary, some of its ventures became ﬁerce
competitors. At the same time, however, the ventures seem to be relatively successful
players in their respective market segments. This is consistent with our central
ﬁnding that strategic substitutabilities between a VC’s portfolio ﬁrms enable the VC
to strengthen performance incentives; (iii) Kleiner & Perkins frequently continued
to be invested in its portfolio ﬁrms, even long after a portfolio ﬁrm’s IPO. This
is consistent with systematic empirical evidence indicating that VC organizations
often retain substantial holdings in their portfolio ﬁrms, even after the expiry of
lock–up provisions (Barry et al. 1990, Gompers and Lerner 1999, Megginson and
Weiss 1991). Our analysis provides a novel explanation for this pattern.
The present research adds to several strands of the literature. Hellmann
(2002) investigates how strategic externalities aﬀect a VC’s coaching incentives. He
ﬁnds that strong complementarities between a venture and the VC’s investment
portfolio commit the VC to support the venture. In case of negative externali-
ties/substitutabilities (e.g. because the VC is invested in a product market competi-
tor), the venture will be ﬁnanced by an independent investor. Hellmann (2002) also
shows that if the negative externality becomes larger, the VC may take a passive
equity stake in the venture in order to weaken the independent investor’s incentives
to provide too much support. While Hellmann (2002) emphasizes the dark side
of substitutabilities, we point to their beneﬁcial aspects, stemming from the VC’s
improved ability to incentivize the entrepreneur. Building on earlier work by Bhat-
tacharya and Chiesa (1995), Leshchinskii (2000) points to a VC’s coordination role
5when funding and coaching two related ventures. He shows that joint funding is
beneﬁcial in order to coordinate R&D investment and, in case of competing ven-
tures, to soften competition by monopolizing one venture and terminating the other.
There is also a relatively large industrial organization literature on the competitive
eﬀects of collaborations between competitors (see e.g. Grossman and Shapiro 1986,
Ordover and Willig 1985, and Shapiro and Willig 1990 for an overview and further
references). In this literature, pro–competitive eﬀects stem from cost eﬃciencies
(resource sharing, joint R&D etc.), while anti–competitive eﬀects arise from the
internalization of competitive externalities.
These contributions largely suggest that a venture’s product market actions and
performance should be softened when ﬁnanced by a VC who holds a stake in an
actual or potential competitor, stemming from the previously mentioned internal-
ization of competitive externalities. Similarly, the VC may want to induce exit of the
entrepreneur, as he partially internalizes the positive externality termination of the
entrepreneur’s venture would exert on the previously funded competitor. The intu-
ition behind this paper’s ﬁndings stems from the observation that, in the presence of
agency problems, it might well be jointly eﬃcient for the VC and the entrepreneur to
commit the entrepreneur to better performance, even if this comes at the expense of
the portfolio ﬁrm. Yet, the VC’s stake in the portfolio ﬁrm enhances the credibility
of a threat to respond to poor performance with termination. This enables the VC
to incentivize the entrepreneur to perform more aggressively than under indepen-
dent VC ﬁnancing. We draw on a similar observation in a companion paper that
explores the antitrust eﬀects of bank–commerce aﬃliations (Arping 2001). There
we consider the eﬀects of a bank’s equity stake in an established competitor of a
borrower on the bank’s ability to commit the borrower not to default strategically
(or to divert funds). We show that the bank’s stake in the competitor relaxes the
borrower’s ﬁnancing constraints. The present paper shows that a similar insight can
be used to not only explain why VC organizations ﬁnance ventures that compete
against their own portfolio ﬁrms, but also to demonstrate that such practice can
strengthen entrepreneurial incentives to compete more aggressively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the formal framework.
Section 3 derives optimal contracts and equilibrium outcomes under independent
VC ﬁnancing. Section 4 turns to venturing by the competitor–aﬃliated VC and
presents the main results of the paper. Section 5 confronts the analysis with a case
study of Kleiner & Perkins’ investment activities in the networking equipment space.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Informal Overview
The framework is designed to capture in the most simple fashion critical features
of the interaction between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist (VC), who pre-
6viously funded a venture the entrepreneur would compete with. The VC’s role is
to provide funding and to monitor the entrepreneur’s actions. By expending eﬀort,
the entrepreneur increases the success prospects of her venture. At the same time,
however, she will exert a negative externality on the previously launched portfolio
ﬁrm of the VC. We will analyze how the strength of the strategic substitutability
between the two ventures aﬀects (i) the VC’s incentives and ability to provide tough
or soft entrepreneurial incentive schemes; and (ii) the entrepreneur’s incentives to
perform (and, hence, her product market aggressiveness).
2.2 Agents and Timing
An entrepreneur needs outside funding to ﬁnance a venture. Funding is to be pro-
vided by a venture capitalist (VC). There is a strategic VC and there are independent
VCs. The strategic VC diﬀers from an independent VC in that the entrepreneur
would exert a negative externality on his existing investment portfolio through com-
peting against one of his portfolio ﬁrms. In contrast, independent VCs’ investment
portfolios are unrelated to the venture. All agents are risk–neutral and the risk free
interest rate is normalized to zero. There are four dates, t = 0;1;2;3. The timing
of events is summarized in ﬁgure 1.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3





Π with pr. e
0 with pr. 1 ¡ e
Figure 1: Timing
At t = 0, there is a ﬁxed start–up investment I > 0. At a later stage, at t = 2,
the project requires a second (ﬁxed) cash infusion K > 0 in order to continue until
ﬁnal cash ﬂows realize at t = 3. The entrepreneur has own wealth A < I, i.e. is nei-
ther able to self–ﬁnance the initial investment outlay I, nor the reinvestment K. At
t = 1, the entrepreneur expends privately costly and unveriﬁable eﬀort e 2 [0;1] (ex-
amples time and eﬀort devoted to R&D, ﬁnding out what potential customers want,
cutting prices and committing to additional orders from customers etc.). The eﬀort
cost function Ã(e) is three times continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and
convex, and satisﬁes the following standard regularity conditions: Ã(0) = Ã0(0) = 0,
Ã000(e) ¸ 0, and lime!1 Ã0(e) = 1. The more eﬀort the entrepreneur exerts at this
stage, the larger will be the likelihood that her product ultimately succeeds in the
market place. However, neither the entrepreneur nor an investor know with cer-
tainty whether the project succeeds until ﬁnal cash ﬂows realize at t = 3. That is,
the ultimate test whether the product succeeds or not is to be provided by the mar-
7ket place. The entrepreneur is indispensable for running the venture and deploying
her product idea.6
Provided the venture receives the reinvestment K, ﬁnal and veriﬁable cash ﬂows
realize at t = 3. Given eﬀort e 2 [0;1], the project is successful with probability e
and fails with probability 1¡e. For simplicity, cash ﬂows are zero in case of failure.
In case of success, cash ﬂows are given by Π > 0. If the reinvestment is not expended
at t = 2, the venture has to close down and is terminated. In order to sharpen the
analysis, we will assume that assets have zero liquidation value. This seems to be
most relevant for the case of venture capital ﬁnancing, where start–up ﬁrms’ assets
typically provide very little collateral value.
2.3 Funding Sources: Strategic vs Independent Venturing
As was mentioned earlier, the entrepreneur has two potential funding sources: she
can either approach one of many independent VCs or she can approach the strategic
VC. Crucially, the entrepreneur would exert a negative externality on the strategic
VC’s investment portfolio through undermining the competitive stance of a portfolio
ﬁrm the strategic VC is invested in.7 This is modelled in the most simple and
straightforward fashion by adopting a reduced from approach:8 if the entrepreneur
stays out or is liquidated at t = 2, the strategic VC gets V at t = 3. If the
entrepreneur enters and is not liquidated, then no matter whether the entrepreneur
is ﬁnanced by the strategic VC or by an independent VC, the strategic VC’s existing
investment portfolio generates income V ¡∆ if the entrepreneur is successful and V
if the entrepreneur fails, where ∆ > 0. The parameter ∆ should be interpreted as the
intensity of competition or as the strength of the strategic substitutability between
the two ventures.9 When ∆ is very small, the ventures’ product oﬀerings are almost
6The implications of this assumption are two fold: First, the venture cannot be continued if the
entrepreneur is ﬁred and replaced by another entrepreneur (for example, an entrepreneur with deep
pockets). Second, investors cannot “steal” the entrepreneur’s product idea. This latter issue may
be of concern in our context. We discuss in section 4 how to extend the framework along those
lines.
7Throughout the paper, we will be relatively mute about the portfolio ﬁrm (e.g. its actions).
See section 4 and the conclusions for further discussion.
8One could refer to a standard Hotelling type of framework (see e.g. Tirole 1990) in order to
explicitly model the product market interaction between the two ventures. However, such an explicit
treatment is not needed for our purposes. It would only put a burden on clarity of the exposition.
9Two companies A and B compete if A’s aggressive pricing constrains B’s ability to charge high
price–cost margins (see e.g. Porter 1985 and Tirole 1990). This does not preclude the possibility that
the companies’ product oﬀerings are highly diﬀerentiated. In case of highly diﬀerentiated products,
A will exert a small negative externality on B (et vice versa), while in case of less diﬀerentiated
products the negative externality will be larger. This feature is captured by our framework and
plays an important role in the analysis. A and B are potential competitors if B’s ability to charge
high margins is constrained by A’s ability to mimick B’s product. For example, if B’s high margins
signaled A that money is to be made from mimicking B’s product, B might refrain from charging
too high prices (while B would charge higher prices if A were not around). For the analysis, it
is relatively unimportant whether the two ventures are actual or potential competitors. What is
important is that the previously funded portfolio ﬁrm beneﬁts from the entrepreneur’s venture
being terminated.
8unrelated; when ∆ is large, there is a substantial degree of substitutability between
the two ventures.10
The parameter assumptions (∆ > 0) imply that if the entrepreneur were backed
by an independent VC and the strategic VC had no ﬁnancial claim in the venture,
then from the strategic VC’s perspective the entrepreneur should be liquidated at
t = 2 (or not enter at all). Similarly, if the entrepreneur stayed around until t = 3,
then, at least, she should refrain from working. In other words, if the strategic
VC ﬁnanced the entrepreneur’s venture and did not prevent the entrepreneur from
working (or even induced her to work harder than under independent venturing), he
would cannibalize his existing investment portfolio. The strategic VC may, however,
soften (or, in principle, strengthen) the entrepreneur’s aggressiveness by altering her
incentives. The strategic VC may, in principle, also prevent the entrepreneur from
competing altogether by acquiring and shelving her product idea (and having the
entrepreneur sign a non–compete clause).11
2.4 Monitoring
Apart from providing funding, a key role of the VC (be it the strategic VC or an
independent VC) is to monitor the entrepreneur.12 This involves visiting the ven-
ture on a regular basis and inspecting the entrepreneur’s progress in developing her
venture. As a result of these monitoring activities (whose costs are ignored, for
simplicity), an investor who starts a ﬁnancing relationship with the entrepreneur at
t = 0 is able to observe the entrepreneur’s eﬀort choice. We assume, however, that
eﬀort is unveriﬁable, i.e. unobservable by the courts. This precludes conditioning
ﬁnancial contracts on eﬀort. Monitoring thus refers to the gathering of soft infor-
mation (rather than gathering hard information or interfering with entrepreneurial
decision making).
In our framework, monitoring and staged ﬁnancing are beneﬁcial because they
enable the VC to condition reﬁnancing on the entrepreneur’s performance. In par-
ticular, provided the VC is not obliged (by a contract) to provide reﬁnancing, the
entrepreneur may have superior incentives to work hard in order to induce the VC
to provide reﬁnancing at better terms. To allow for this possibility, we will equip
the VC with the option to withhold reﬁnancing.13 If after having observed the en-
trepreneur’s eﬀort the VC happens to be better oﬀ with withholding reﬁnancing
10The parameter ∆ is also inﬂuenced by the size and the cash ﬂow sensitivity of the VC’s claim
in the portfolio ﬁrm.
11Non–compete clauses are commonplace in venture ﬁnancing (Kaplan and Str¨ omberg 2001).
However, in some jurisdictions (e.g. the State of California) non–compete clauses are not enforceable.
We discuss below how the analysis would be altered if non–compete clauses could not be enforced
in court.
12See Gompers (1995), Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Hellmann and Puri (2000), Lerner (1995),
and Sahlman (1990) for empirical evidence pointing to the pivotal role of VCs in monitoring their
portfolio ﬁrms.
13This will be optimal in our framework. It is also consistent with empirical evidence put for-
ward by Gompers (1995), Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2000), and Sahlman (1990) that investment and
ﬁnancing are typically staged and that termination rights held by VCs are pretty draconian.
9but reinvestment is eﬃcient, then the entrepreneur has the opportunity to make a
new oﬀer that makes the VC willing to close the reﬁnancing gap (in other words,
the entrepreneur would have to raise the VC’s compensation). We assume that the
entrepreneur has the bargaining power when making such an oﬀer.14 Furthermore,
renegotiation is bilateral, i.e. only the initial investor and the entrepreneur bargain
over contract terms. Uninformed outsiders stay out.
We exclude side contracting between an independent VC and the strategic VC or
between the entrepreneur and the strategic VC under independent venture ﬁnancing.
Speciﬁcally, at t = 0, the entrepreneur will bargain with either the strategic VC or
an independent VC about funding terms. If she obtains funding from either party,
she won’t see the other again. Lastly, the entrepreneur has the ex ante bargaining
power over investors (including the strategic VC).15
3 Independent VC Financing
This section considers the ﬁnancing problem between the entrepreneur and an in-
dependent VC. A ﬁnancial contract speciﬁes the VC’s share ® of the venture’s cash
ﬂows, conditional on the VC contributing I ¡ A at t = 0 and providing reﬁnancing
K at t = 2.16 To see how the VC’s option to withhold reﬁnancing can discipline the
entrepreneur note that if the VC provides reﬁnancing immediately (without further
bargaining with the entrepreneur) he derives an expected payoﬀ of e®Π¡K, where
e is the actual eﬀort level expended by the entrepreneur. If the VC does not provide
reﬁnancing, his payoﬀ is zero. Hence, the VC is willing to provide reﬁnancing imme-
diately if and only if e®Π ¸ K, i.e. the entrepreneur works hard enough. Conversely,
for e®Π < K, the VC does not provide reﬁnancing immediately. Instead, the VC
lets the entrepreneur make him a better oﬀer. The entrepreneur thus partially in-
ternalizes the cost of shirking. In what follows, we elaborate on this renegotiation
game between the VC and the entrepreneur.
Suppose ﬁrst that reﬁnancing the venture is ineﬃcient, given the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort level, e < K=Π. Thus, even if the entrepreneur were to oﬀer the VC a
100% stake in her venture in exchange for the VC providing funding, the VC would
not break even. Consequently, the VC decides to terminate the venture. Next,
suppose that K=Π · e < K=(®Π), so the VC is still better oﬀ with withholding
reﬁnancing. However, reinvestment is eﬃcient and expected cash ﬂows are suﬃcient
14Crucially, the entrepreneur has to have some bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor
had the full bargaining power, the investor would abuse his power to withhold reﬁnancing even if
the entrepreneur did not shirk (Rajan 1992). Consequently, the investor would have to commit
ex ante to provide full reﬁnancing and monitoring would be pointless. As for the case of venture
ﬁnancing, one could argue that the hold up problem presumably is of little concern as VCs would
lose their reputational capital if engaging in such practice. If the hold up problem were a serious
concern, then one should not observe VCs holding draconian termination rights.
15This is purely for simplicity. If the strategic VC had the ex ante bargaining power over the
entrepreneur, the paper’s results would be strengthened.
16It is easily veriﬁed that under independent VC ﬁnancing the entrepreneur invests her entire
wealth into the project in order to minimize the outside ﬁnancing burden.
10to compensate the VC for providing K. The entrepreneur thus oﬀers a larger share,
®(e) > ®, in order to induce the VC to provide reﬁnancing. The VC is willing
to accept the entrepreneur’s oﬀer if and only if e®(e)Π ¸ K. After renegotiation,
the VC thus holds a stake ®(e) = K=(eΠ) > ®. Finally, for e ¸ K=(®Π), the VC
is better oﬀ providing reﬁnancing immediately. The entrepreneur’s payoﬀ function
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(1)
Let e¤¤ denote the entrepreneur’s equilibrium eﬀort level under independent VC







I ¡ A + K
(2)
since I > A. In other words, a threat to terminate the venture following a slight
deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level lacks credibility. The equilibrium eﬀort
level is thus characterized by the standard incentive constraint under arm’s length
ﬁnancing,
(1 ¡ ®)Π = Ã0(e¤¤) (3)
The ﬁrst best eﬀort level under independent VC ﬁnancing is turn given by the (unique
and interior) solution of Π = Ã0(eFB). We can claim the following
Proposition 1 Under independent VC ﬁnancing, the VC provides initial funding
I¡A and reﬁnancing K and obtains a share ® = (I¡A+K)=(e¤¤Π) of the venture’s
cash ﬂows. The entrepreneur’s performance e¤¤ is given by the largest solution of
µ
1 ¡
I ¡ A + K
e¤¤Π
¶
Π = Ã0(e¤¤) (4)
Performance is strictly inferior to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level eFB.
A threat to withhold reﬁnancing provides no disciplinary power under independent
VC ﬁnancing. Hence, it does not allow to improve performance upon arm’s length
ﬁnancing. The intuition is that following a slight deviation from the equilibrium
eﬀort level the VC has too much to lose and too little to gain from terminating the
venture. The VC would lose his long term ﬁnancial claim in the venture. In equi-
librium, this claim is just suﬃcient to compensate the VC for the initial investment
I ¡A > 0 and the reﬁnancing funds K. What the VC gains from not reﬁnancing is
the reinvestment K. Hence, as long as I > A, the VC would not use the termina-
tion option as a threat point in renegotiation, following a small deviation from the
equilibrium eﬀort level.17 Instead, he would pick the reﬁnancing option. A threat
17This mirrors results by Repullo and Suarez (1998), who examine the eﬀects of collateral and
multiple source ﬁnancing on the credibility of liquidation threats and managerial incentives. They
show that strong collateral values enhance managerial incentives to perform. As will be shown
below, our analysis suggests that a stake in a competitor can eﬀectively serve as a substitute for
collateral. This seems to be particularly relevant in venture capital ﬁnancing, where assets typically
have little collateral value.
11to terminate thus lacks credibility, implying that the only sustainable eﬀort level is
the equilibrium eﬀort level under arm’s length ﬁnancing.
We assume that independent VC ﬁnancing is feasible and proﬁtable, implying
that the joint surplus gain for the independent VC and the entrepreneur is strictly
positive,
e¤¤Π ¡ Ã(e¤¤) ¡ I ¡ K > 0 (5)
Furthermore, in equilibrium, reinvestment must be ex post eﬃcient. Otherwise,
outside ﬁnancing would not have been feasible in the ﬁrst place. The entrepreneur’s
payoﬀ under independent VC ﬁnancing thus amounts to
e¤¤Π ¡ Ã(e¤¤) ¡ I + A ¡ K > A (6)
while the strategic VC derives a payoﬀ of
e¤¤(V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e¤¤)V < V (7)
The payoﬀs under independent VC ﬁnancing deﬁne the parties’ respective outside
option payoﬀs under venturing by the strategic VC.
4 Cannibalization & Incentives
We now turn to venturing by the strategic VC, taking the parties’ outside option
payoﬀs as given. Let e¤ denote the entrepreneur’s equilibrium eﬀort level under
venturing by the strategic VC. Conditional on the venture being reﬁnanced, the
ex ante joint surplus of the VC and the entrepreneur from launching the venture
amounts to
e¤(Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e¤)V ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤) (8)
Conversely, if the venture is not launched, the joint surplus is given by V . Launching
the venture is thus jointly eﬃcient for the entrepreneur and the VC if and only if
e¤(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤) ¸ 0 (9)
which holds for e¤ suﬃciently large and ∆ suﬃciently small. Denote by eFB(∆)
the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level for the entrepreneur and the VC, conditional on
the venture being launched and reﬁnanced. By inspection, for Π ¸ ∆, the jointly
eﬃcient eﬀort level is given by the solution of
Π ¡ ∆ ¡ Ã0(e) = 0 (10)
Note that eFB(∆) is continuous and strictly decreasing in ∆. In other words, the
jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level under venturing by the strategic VC is strictly inferior to
the ﬁrst best eﬀort level under independent VC ﬁnancing. This stems of course from
the negative externality the entrepreneur exerts on the strategic investor’s portfolio
ﬁrm when working hard.
12Suppose the entrepreneur would stick to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level if the venture
were launched. Hence, launching the venture would be eﬃcient if and only if
S(∆) = eFB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ K ¡ I ¡ Ã(eFB(∆)) ¸ 0 (11)
Note that S(∆) is continuous and strictly decreasing,18 and satisﬁes S(0) > 0 and
S(Π) < 0. Hence, there exists a critical threshold ∆¤ 2 (0;Π) such that launching
the venture would be eﬃcient if and only if ∆ · ∆¤, provided the entrepreneur
sticked to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. Summarizing,
Lemma 1 Suppose the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by the strategic VC. Then, there
exists a threshold ∆¤ 2 (0;Π) such that for ∆ · ∆¤ the venture is launched under
the ﬁrst best. The entrepreneur’s eﬀort level under the ﬁrst best is strictly decreasing
in ∆. For ∆ > ∆¤, the venture is not launched and the entrepreneur’s product
market idea is shelved.
The lemma shows that in the absence of moral hazard the entrepreneur’s perfor-
mance under venturing by the strategic VC would be strictly inferior to her perfor-
mance under independent VC ﬁnancing. Furthermore, as the negative externality
imposed on the strategic VC becomes stronger, the entrepreneur would compete less
aggressively. While these observations provide a useful benchmark, they might be ir-
relevant in practice. In particular, as long as ∆ is not too large, the jointly eﬃcient
eﬀort level will exceed the distorted eﬀort level under independent VC ﬁnancing.
In this case, it will be jointly eﬃcient for the entrepreneur and the strategic VC
to compete more aggressively than under independent venturing, even though this
undermines the competitive stance of the strategic VC’s portfolio ﬁrm. Formally,
deﬁne ¯ ∆ by
eFB(¯ ∆) ´ e¤¤ (12)
From the ﬁrst order condition deﬁning the ﬁrst best eﬀort level, (10), and the in-
centive constraint under arm’s length ﬁnancing (4), ¯ ∆ is given by
¯ ∆ =
I ¡ A + K
e¤¤ (13)
For ∆ < ¯ ∆, the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level for the entrepreneur and the VC strictly
exceeds the equilibrium eﬀort level under independent venturing. Next, deﬁne ∆ by
e¤¤∆ ´ I ¡ A (14)
Note that 0 < ∆ < ¯ ∆ < Π. The following lemma shows that ∆ ¸ ∆ is a necessary
condition for the entrepreneur’s performance to be higher than under independent
venturing.
Lemma 2 Suppose the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by the strategic VC and the venture
is launched. Then, as long as the strategic VC breaks even in equilibrium, a threat
to terminate the venture following a slight deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort level
is credible if and only if ∆ ¸ ∆.
18Formally, from the envelope theorem, S
0(∆) = ¡e
FB(∆) < 0 (for ∆ < Π).
13Intuitively, as long as e¤¤∆ ¸ I¡A, the potential gain from ﬁnancing the venture and
exercising the termination option is more than suﬃcient to compensate the strategic
VC for providing I¡A, even if the entrepreneur does not promise any payment prior
to the VC providing reﬁnancing. This is because if the strategic VC did not ﬁnance
the venture, he would derive a payoﬀ of V ¡ e¤¤∆. If he ﬁnanced the venture and
exercised the termination option, his payoﬀ would amount to V ¡ (I ¡ A). Hence,
as long as e¤¤∆ ¸ I ¡ A, there is in principle no need to promise the strategic
VC a stake in the venture in order for the VC to be willing to provide the initial
ﬁnancing. This implies that a threat to terminate the venture is credible, as the VC
loses nothing if he terminates the venture (to the contrary, he might make a proﬁt).
In contrast, when e¤¤∆ < I ¡ A, the VC must be promised a positive payoﬀ prior
to providing reﬁnancing. The VC would therefore not terminate the venture if the
entrepreneur deviated slightly from the equilibrium eﬀort level.
There is thus a non–empty interval Σ = [∆; ¯ ∆) ½ IR¤
+, such that for any ∆ 2 Σ
the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level strictly exceeds the equilibrium eﬀort level under
independent venturing and a threat to terminate the venture is credible. Next,
deﬁne ∆p by
e¤¤(Π ¡ ∆p) ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤¤) ´ 0 (15)
For ∆ · ∆p, it is eﬃcient for the VC and the entrepreneur to launch the venture,
provided the entrepreneur sticks to the eﬀort level under independent venturing.
In order not to inﬂate the number of cases to be considered, we will assume that
∆p ¸ ∆ (formally, this amounts to e¤¤Π ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤¤) ¸ I ¡ A). Hence, for
∆ < ∆, launching the venture is eﬃcient if the entrepreneur sticks to e¤¤. It is then
easily veriﬁed that ∆p ¸ ∆ implies ∆¤ > ∆. Thus, for some ∆ 2 Σ (if not all) it is
eﬃcient to launch the venture if the entrepreneur sticks to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level.
We are now ready to state the paper’s main results. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium eﬀort level for the case of a small strategic substi-
tutability between the venture and the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 Suppose the strategic substitutability between the entrepreneur’s
venture and the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm is small, ∆ < ∆. Then, no matter whether
the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by an independent VC or by the strategic VC, the
entrepreneur expends the eﬀort level under arm’s length ﬁnancing e¤¤. Conse-
quently, the negative externality imposed on the strategic VC has no eﬀect on the
entrepreneur’s performance.
When the strategic substitutability between the two ventures is small, then there
is neither a reason to induce the entrepreneur to compete less aggressively nor a
means to make her work harder. This is because the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level is
still above the distorted eﬀort level under independent venturing, but termination
threats are not yet eﬀective.
Next, consider the intermediate range of substitutabilities, ∆ 2 [∆; ¯ ∆). The
following proposition demonstrates that the entrepreneur is ventured by the strategic
14VC and expends the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. In particular, the entrepreneur competes
more aggressively than under independent venturing.
Proposition 3 Suppose ∆ 2 [∆; ¯ ∆) and ∆ · ∆¤. Then,
² (ﬁnancing) the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by the strategic VC. The VC commits
to an initial cash transfer T = e¤¤∆ ¸ I ¡ A and holds the right to either
(i) close the reﬁnancing gap by providing funds K ¡ [T ¡ (I ¡ A)] > 0 and
obtain a share
® =
I ¡ A + K + (eFB(∆) ¡ e¤¤)∆
eFB(∆)Π
(16)
of the venture’s product market income, or to
(ii) terminate the venture and receive nothing.
The entrepreneur commits to contribute her cash balance T ¡ (I ¡ A) to reﬁ-
nancing her venture, conditional on the VC closing the reﬁnancing gap.
² (performance) the entrepreneur expends the ﬁrst best eﬀort level eFB(∆). In
particular, the entrepreneur competes more aggressively than under indepen-
dent venturing, eFB(∆) > e¤¤.
When the strategic substitutability between the two competing ventures is smaller
than some threshold, the jointly eﬃcient performance for the strategic VC and the
entrepreneur is strictly superior to the equilibrium performance under independent
venturing. An optimal ﬁnancial contract thus induces the entrepreneur to expend
at least the eﬀort level under independent venturing. The proposition demonstrates
that if the strategic substitutability is not too small either, then the contracting par-
ties can achieve an even better performance. This is accomplished by designing the
ﬁnancial contract in such a way that the VC is incentivized to withhold reﬁnancing
if and only if the entrepreneur shirks, i.e. deviates from the ﬁrst best eﬀort level.
The VC must have neither too soft nor excessive incentives to terminate the venture.
Equipping the VC with the option to eﬀectively terminate the venture addresses the
ﬁrst concern, while reducing the VC’s incremental contribution to reﬁnancing the
venture addresses the second. In particular, if the VC closes the reﬁnancing gap,
he can call the entrepreneur’s cash balance as to eﬀectively reduce his contribution.
This makes the VC willing to reﬁnance the venture, rather than opportunistically
terminating the venture in order to protect the previously funded portfolio ﬁrm.
The optimal ﬁnancial contract has debt and equity features. Conditional on pro-
viding reﬁnancing, the VC obtains a share ® of the venture’s product market income.
In addition, the VC has a ﬁxed claim on the venture’s cash balance. The former
element can be viewed as equity, the latter as debt. More important for the purpose
of this paper are the competitive eﬀects of the strategic substitutability between
the two ventures on the entrepreneur’s performance: Relative to independent VC
15ﬁnancing, the entrepreneur competes more aggressively when ﬁnanced by the strate-
gic VC. In other words, the competitive stance of the strategic VC’s portfolio ﬁrm
would have been less eroded if the VC rejected to ﬁnance the venture. The strategic
VC thus willingly cannibalizes his previously funded portfolio ﬁrm. He is willing
to do so because in equilibrium he is fully compensated for having the competitive
stance of his portfolio ﬁrm eroded. If the VC had ex ante bargaining power over the
entrepreneur, he would even capture part (or all) of the surplus gain from ﬁnancing
the entrepreneur, i.e. make a proﬁt. Intuitively, the stake in the previously funded
portfolio ﬁrm equips the strategic VC with a competitive advantage to incentivize
the entrepreneur to perform better, i.e. to compete more aggressively. Further-
more, it may very well be that by establishing a ﬁnancing relationship with the
entrepreneur, the strategic VC is able to improve the performance of the previously
funded portfolio ﬁrm (even though the entrepreneur competes more aggressively
relative to independent venture backing). The same intuition that explains why
the entrepreneur competes more aggressively would also allow to explain why the
portfolio ﬁrm shows better performance.19
Next, suppose the strategic substitutability between the two ventures is larger
than ¯ ∆ but not suﬃciently large as to justify not launching the entrepreneur’s
venture. Then, we have the following
Proposition 4 Suppose ¯ ∆ · ∆ · ∆¤. Then,
² (ﬁnancing) the entrepreneur is ﬁnanced by the strategic VC. The VC commits
to an initial cash transfer T = e¤¤∆ ¸ I ¡ A + K in exchange for a share
® = ∆=Π of the venture’s product market income. The VC does not hold any
termination rights. The entrepreneur reﬁnances her venture out of her cash
balance T ¡ (I ¡ A).
² (performance) the entrepreneur expends the ﬁrst best eﬀort level eFB(∆).
For ∆ > ¯ ∆, the entrepreneur is softer than under independent venturing,
eFB(∆) < e¤¤.
While launching the venture is still jointly eﬃcient for the strategic VC and the
entrepreneur, it is no longer eﬃcient to incentivize the entrepreneur to compete
more aggressively than under independent venturing. The strategic substitutability
between the two competing ventures is too strong. It is thus optimal to soften
19Standard industrial organization models suggest that two competitors wish to jointly commit
to softening their product market actions, at the expense of their customers (see e.g. Tirole 1990).
Moreover, as long as product market actions are strategic complements, a ﬁrm will become more
aggressive if the competitor becomes more aggressive too. These considerations may be irrelevant as
soon as the competitors’ actions are distorted due to the presence of agency problems. In particular,
one ﬁrm becoming more aggressive may have no impact on the competitor’s actions as long as those
actions are suﬃciently distorted. Similarly, the two competitors may very well wish to commit to
be more “aggressive” (i.e. to perform better) — to their joint beneﬁt (and to the beneﬁt of their
customers). Our analysis suggests that the strategic VC may play exactly the role of incentivizing
the two competitors to be more aggressive, rather than inducing them to be softer.
16the entrepreneur’s performance incentives. This is accomplished by equipping the
strategic VC with a soft equity–like claim in order to dilute the entrepreneur’s claim.
Crucially, ﬁnancing the competing venture eﬀectively enables the strategic VC to
control the entrepreneur’s product market actions and to align her incentives with
his own interests.
The next proposition shows that when the strategic substitutability becomes
very large, the entrepreneur’s venture will no longer be launched.
Proposition 5 Suppose ∆ > ∆¤. Then, the entrepreneur is bought out by the
strategic VC against a cash transfer T = e¤¤∆ and her product market idea is shelved.
When the strategic substitutability becomes very large, it is no longer eﬃcient to
invest in the ﬁrst place. Hence, the venture is bought out by the strategic VC.
Doing so enables the strategic VC to prevent the entrepreneur from competing.20
Note that rich entrepreneurs (those with large internal funds) receive a particularly
high transfer payment in a buy out. This is because they have a credible threat
to compete aggressively under independent VC ﬁnancing. Poor entrepreneurs are
softer under independent VC ﬁnancing, hence, they receive less in a buy out.21
Figure 2 summarizes the entrepreneur’s performance (bold line) as a function of the
strength of the strategic substitutability between the venture and the VC’s portfolio
ﬁrm:
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Figure 2: Performance
20Naturally, this rests on the assumption that non–competing clauses are enforceable. If non–
compete clauses could not be enforced in court, the qualitative results would continue to hold true
as long as the strategic VC can prevent the entrepreneur from competing by ﬁnancing her venture,
committing the entrepreneur to her ﬁrm, and irreversibly liquidating her venture at a later stage.
21See Cestone and White (2002) for a model where a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancier may take an equity stake in
order to commit to deny funding to future competitors. For ∆ suﬃciently large, this consideration
would be equally relevant in our setting if the entrepreneur did not have a credible threat to source
funding elsewhere.
17For ∆ < ∆, the negative externality imposed on the strategic VC’s investment port-
folio has no eﬀect on the venture’s performance relative to independent venturing.
At ∆ = ∆, the VC can impose a credible termination threat as a result of which
the eﬀort level jumps to the ﬁrst best. Performance is then gradually decreasing, as
the entrepreneur internalizes the negative externality imposed on the VC’s invest-
ment portfolio. At ∆ = ¯ ∆, we are back to the distorted arm’s length eﬀort level.
Performance is further decreasing, until it no longer pays to launch the venture.
Figure 2 also illustrates the basic intuition behind our results. For ∆ < ¯ ∆, the
jointly eﬃcient eﬀort level for the VC and the entrepreneur exceeds the equilibrium
eﬀort level under independent venture backing. Consequently, the joint objective of
the VC and the entrepreneur is to ﬁnd a mechanism that induces the entrepreneur
to work harder than under independent VC ﬁnancing. A novelty of this paper is
to show that the VC will use his stronger commitment to terminate reﬁnancing in
order to incentivize the entrepreneur. For ∆ > ¯ ∆, the joint objective is no longer to
incentivize the entrepreneur to work harder. Rather, the issue is how to prevent the
entrepreneur from working too hard (in particular, the entrepreneur should work less
than under independent VC ﬁnancing). The VC holding equity allows to accomplish
this goal. Equity dilutes the entrepreneur’s claim and thus softens her performance
incentives.
We will close this section by providing a brief discussion how to enrich our
framework to account for weak property rights. A number of recent papers (Anand
and Galetovic 2000, Anton and Yao 1994, 1995, Ueda 2000) studied the consequences
of weak property rights in situations where either the ﬁnancier may “steal” an
entrepreneur’s idea (Anton/Yao, Ueda) or an entrepreneur/researcher may ex post
breakaway from a ﬁnancier and launch her project elsewhere (Anand/Galetovic).22
In our context, the ﬁrst issue might have some relevance, namely, the strategic VC
could have incentives to “steal” the entrepreneur’s product idea when screening her
project in order to prevent the entrepreneur from competing against his portfolio
ﬁrm. We will provide a brief extension along those lines.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following (arguably simplistic) framework. From an
ex ante perspective, the entrepreneur does not know whether the strategic VC is
able to deploy her product idea (e.g. at the portfolio ﬁrm) or whether the VC
is willing to incur the loss of reputation when stealing her idea. Formally, suppose
that with probability ½ the VC will steal the entrepreneur’s product idea, while with
probability 1¡½ the VC is either not able or not willing to do so. Suppose too that
the VC insists on screening the entrepreneur’s project prior to providing funding
(otherwise the VC would attract lots of entrepreneurs with worthless projects).
While having her project screened, the entrepreneur reveals her product idea to the
VC. Also, the VC reveals its type to the entrepreneur (the VC has no reason to hide
his intentions). Next, if the VC deployed the idea, he would completely undermine
the entrepreneur’s prospects to ever reap positive proﬁts. Finally, suppose that an
22Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), and Yosha (1995) address
related issues.
18independent investor has no interest in stealing the entrepreneur’s product idea.23
Hence, if the entrepreneur approached the strategic VC, asked for funding, and
had her project screened, then with probability ½ launching the project would no
longer be worthwhile for the entrepreneur. A threat to seek funding elsewhere
and compete against the VC’s portfolio ﬁrm would no longer be credible. The
entrepreneur would thus end up with her internal funds A. With probability 1 ¡ ½,
however, the VC would not steal the entrepreneur’s idea. Hence, the venture would
either be launched or be bought out by the VC. The entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ
when approaching the VC thus amounts to
A + (1 ¡ ½)(e¤¤Π ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤¤)) (17)
for ∆ < ∆ and




eFB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(eFB(∆));0
i´
(18)
for ∆ ¸ ∆. When approaching an independent VC, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is in
turn given by
A + e¤¤Π ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e¤¤) (19)
Note that (19) strictly exceeds (17), while (18) exceeds (19) for ½ suﬃciently small.
We thus have the following
Proposition 6 Suppose the entrepreneur faces the risk of being expropriated by the
strategic VC, ½ > 0. Then,
² for ∆ < ∆, the entrepreneur will be ﬁnanced by an independent VC
² for ∆ ¸ ∆, the entrepreneur will be ﬁnanced by the strategic VC if and only
if the risk of expropriation is suﬃciently small, ½ · ½¤, where ½¤ 2 (0;1).
When the entrepreneur faces the risk that the strategic VC may steal her product
idea, she will have to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of being ﬁnanced by the strategic VC with
the risk of losing her product idea.24 One would expect expropriation risk (½) to be
negatively correlated with the ﬁnancier’s reputation but to be positively correlated
with the extent of the competitive threat the venture imposes on the ﬁnancier’s
portfolio ﬁrm. This suggests that expropriation risk should be of little concern
for the entrepreneur as long as she is backed by an experienced and established
ﬁnancier (and the competitive threat imposed on the ﬁnancier’s portfolio ﬁrm is not
too severe).25 The next section provides an examination of the investment activities
of Kleiner & Perkins, a distinguished and reputable venture capital ﬁrm, in light of
the analysis.
23All what matters is that the strategic VC has a stronger interest to steal the entrepreneur’s
product idea than an independent investor.
24As discussed in the introduction, Hellmann (2002) suggests another potential cost of being
funded by the strategic VC. He shows that strategic substitutabilities may undermine the VC’s
incentives to provide the venture with support. This suggests that the entrepreneur might have to
trade oﬀ the potential lack of support with her superior commitment to perform if backed by the
strategic VC.
25See Hellmann (1997) for an insightful discussion about the risk of expropriation in venturing
ﬁnancing.
195 Kleiner & Perkins: Keiretsu vs Cannibalization
Since its foundation in 1972, Kleiner & Perkins (short for Kleiner, Perkins, Cauﬁeld
& Byers) has invested in hundreds of companies “that have resulted in the creation
of over 250,000 new jobs, over $100 billion in new revenue, and over $650 billion
in market capitalization”.26 Among those companies are household names, such as
Amazon.com, AOL, Compaq, Sun Microsystems, Genentech, Juniper Networks, and
Netscape. Kleiner & Perkins is known for its keiretsu approach to venture investing.
This is best illustrated with the following quote, taken from Kleiner & Perkins’
website:
“One of the best ways to launch a new venture and grow it into a
successful enterprise is through forming partnerships. To help expedite
relationships, we put together an informal network of our portfolio com-
panies. [...] The Keiretsu gives emerging start up companies a unique
ability to learn from more established operations, entrepreneurs an op-
portunity to pool their experiences, and companies an environment to
explore synergies.”
Kleiner & Perkins indeed backed many companies that complement each other.
Consider, for example, some of Kleiner & Perkins’ investments along the network-
ing supply chain (table 1). Kleiner & Perkins backed a number of exchange carriers,
such as XO Communications, Zephion Networks, Broadband Oﬃce, 360networks,
and OnFiber Communications.27 These companies are potential customers of net-
working equipment makers. Within this segment, Kleiner & Perkins ﬁnanced numer-
ous companies, for example Corvis, Lightera (acquired by Ciena), Siara (acquired
by Redback), ONI Systems, Zaﬃre (acquired by Centerpoint), and Juniper Net-
works. These companies in turn source from component makers, e.g. those backed
by Kleiner & Perkins, namely Kymata (acquired by Alcatel), Iolon, and Cenix.
It is easy to see how such a supply chain network with a VC partner assum-
ing a coordinating role between upstream and downstream ﬁrms can help to create
value. For example, by funding and assisting downstream ﬁrms a VC partner may
acquire expertise about their needs and requirements. Channeling this knowledge
to upstream ﬁrms should help these ﬁrms to develop their businesses. Conversely,
through dealing with upstream ﬁrms, the VC partner may get a precise idea what
these ﬁrms can deliver. This in turn should facilitate decision making at the down-
stream end of the market. The VC partner may also play a decisive role in bringing
customers and suppliers together in the ﬁrst place.28 Furthermore, having a stake
in an upstream ﬁrm can help to commit the VC partner to provide a downstream
26See Kleiner & Perkins’ website at http://www.kpcb.com.
27By the end of 2001, Zephion Networks and Broadband Oﬃce closed down and 360networks
ﬁled for bankruptcy. XO Communications had its stock voluntarily delisted from the Nasdaq
exchange after announcing that two strategic investors would supply the company with fresh money
in exchange for control and new equity. OnFiber is held privately.
28See Lightreading, April 05, 2000, and June 01, 2001, for anecdotes of how Kleiner & Perkins
tried to inﬂuence Kleiner & Perkins backed carriers to purchase equipment from Kleiner & Perkins
20market segment KP companies
component makers Kymata (Alcatel), Iolon, Cenix
equipment makers Lightera (Ciena), Corvis,
ONI Systems, Zaﬃre (Centerpoint)
Siara (Redback), Juniper Networks
exchange carriers XO Communications, Zephion Networks,
BroadBand Oﬃce, 360networks,
OnFiber Communications
Table 1: Kleiner & Perkins’ networking supply chain
ﬁrm with support and advice, because ultimately the latter could be a customer of
the former.29
A closer look at Kleiner & Perkins’ networking keiretsu reveals, however, that
within segments of the networking supply chain, Kleiner & Perkins backed ventures
that were actual or potential competitors. In what follows, we will illustrate such
practice with some of Kleiner & Perkins’ investments in the networking equipment
space (table 2). These examples have in common that Kleiner & Perkins invested
in a venture at a time where it still had a signiﬁcant stake in another, previously
launched venture. Moreover, the two ventures were actual or potential competitors.
This corresponds exactly to the pattern proposed in our formal framework.
KP company ﬁrst inv. status KP stake
Lightera na acq. by Ciena (03/99) na
Corvis 05/98 IPO 07/00 10% (04/01)
ONI Systems 01/98 IPO 06/00 9% (04/01)
Zaﬃre 08/00 acq. by Centerpoint (10/01) na
CoSine 03/99 IPO 09/00 7% (09/00)
Smartpipes 03/00 private na
Cerent 04/97 acq. by Cisco (08/99) 30% (08/99)
Siara na acq. by Redback (03/00) na
Zepton Networks 03/01 private na
Table 2: Networking equipment portfolio
companies. Vinod Khosla, a partner at Kleiner & Perkins, also has a board seat at Qwest Com-
munications, a carrier not backed by Kleiner & Perkins, but a customer of e.g. Corvis and Juniper
Networks.
29See Hellmann (2002) for a model along those lines. Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) provide
empirical evidence about the role of VCs in supporting ﬁrms to shape their product market strategies
and to develop their ventures.
21Ciena and Corvis are makers of optical networking equipment for telecommunica-
tion carriers.30 Ciena became a leader in the market for optical switches through its
March 1999 acquisition of Lightera, a Kleiner & Perkins’ backed venture. Its ﬂagship
product, the CoreDirector, is a so–called optical–electrical–optical (“OEO”) switch
in that it relies on electrical regeneration of light signals.31 In May 1998, i.e. almost
one year before Ciena’s acquisition of the CoreDirector, Kleiner & Perkin’s made its
ﬁrst investment in Corvis. The value proposition of Corvis stems from an all–optical
concept. In particular, Corvis’ ﬂagship optical switch does not rely on electrical re-
generation of light signals, but instead has an optical core. All–optical switching
is widely regarded to be more cost eﬀective than OEO switching, suggesting that
Corvis could severely undermine Ciena’s competitive stance. However, there are cer-
tain technical bottlenecks associated with all–optical switches, as a result of which
carriers typically deploy the two products in diﬀerent parts of their networks.32 This
suggests that the two products are best viewed as imperfect substitutes. By the end
of 2001, Corvis complemented its product portfolio with an OEO switch. This puts
Corvis into “direct” competition with Lightera/Ciena.
ONI Systems and Zaﬃre (acquired by Centerpoint in October 2001) produce
next–generation optical networking gear for metropolitan networks. Kleiner &
Perkins made its ﬁrst investment in ONI Systems in January 1998, the company
went public in June 2000. Two months later, in August 2000, Kleiner & Perkins
made its ﬁrst investment in Zaﬃre, while still holding a signiﬁcant equity stake
in ONI Systems (in April 2001, it had a 9% stake).33 While ONI Systems’ and
Zaﬃre’s respective product oﬀerings display some degree of diﬀerentiation, the two
companies are widely regarded to be competitors.34
CoSine Communications and Smartpipes are makers of virtual private network-
ing hard– and software. The ﬁrst investment in CoSine was made in March 1999,
CoSine went public in September 2000 (at that time, Kleiner & Perkins held a 7%
stake in CoSine).35 Six months before the IPO, in March 2000, Kleiner & Perkins
made its ﬁrst investment in Smartpipes. CoSine and Smartpipes are deemed to be
potential competitors (Red Herring, May 2001).
Siara and Cerent emerged from the break up of another company, Fiberlane
Communications, after an internal ﬁght between two camps of engineers.36 Kleiner
& Perkins ﬁnanced Fiberlane and continued to fund both Siara and Cerent as stand–
30Interestingly, both have the same founder, David Huber, who is now CEO of Corvis.
31See Lightreading at http://www.lightreading.com for a collection of white papers explaining
the technical aspects of optical networking gear.
32Importantly, however, carriers can rely on either OEO or OOO switches. This implies that
Lightera/Ciena’s pricing power is constrained by Corvis’ pricing (et vice versa). See footnote 9 for
further discussion of when two companies compete and when not.
33See ONI System’s April 2001 proxy ﬁling.
34See various reports at Lightreading.
35See Cosine’s S–1 ﬁling, September 2000.
36See Red Herring, September 1999, and The Press Democrat, December 12, 1999.
22alone units.37 In August 1999, Cerent was acquired by Cisco Systems (for a record
amount), while Siara was acquired by Redback Networks in March 2000. Both
Cerent and Siara provided telecommunication carriers with optical networking gear
to enhance the eﬃciency of their ﬁrst–generation SONET optical networks. The
available evidence suggests that while their products were initially meant to address
diﬀerent needs, the companies eventually broadened their product portfolios and
re–entered each others turf.38
In March 2001, Kleiner & Perkins invested in Zepton Networks, a start–up com-
pany devoted to optical networking gear. The company is mute on what kind of
products it will eventually deliver. Company sources suggest, however, that its tech-
nology could be quite drastic. To quote founder David Welch, “we are drawing on
systems– and component–level expertise to deliver a product that will revolutionize
optical networking.” (Light Reading, June 26, 2001). In April 2001, Kleiner &
Perkins held a 10% stake in optical networking equipment maker Corvis and a 9%
stake in metro optical systems maker ONI Systems.
These examples reveal a common pattern: Kleiner & Perkins invested in a com-
peting venture at a time where it still had a sizable (but not excessively large)
stake in a portfolio ﬁrm. Moreover, the ventures’ respective product oﬀerings often
displayed some degree of diﬀerentiation. This suggests that in practice the inter-
mediate range of strategic substitutabilities considered in the previous section is
indeed most relevant. In many cases, even long after a portfolio ﬁrm’s IPO and
the expiry of lock–up provisions, did Kleiner & Perkins continue to be invested in
a portfolio ﬁrm.39 This is consistent with more systematic empirical evidence indi-
cating that venture capital organizations often retain substantial holdings in their
portfolio ﬁrms, even long after a portfolio ﬁrm’s IPO (Barry et al. 1990, Gompers
and Lerner 1999, Megginson and Weiss 1991). It is also consistent with our theory
that a VC may want to retain a stake in a portfolio ﬁrm in order gain a competitive
advantage in ﬁnancing an actual or a potential competitor of that portfolio ﬁrm.40
The case study also provides support for our main prediction that a stake in
a portfolio ﬁrm enhances a VC’s ability to strengthen entrepreneurial performance
incentives. In particular, Kleiner & Perkins does not seem to have played a role
in softening competition. To the contrary, some of its portfolio ﬁrms became ﬁerce
competitors. The Lightera/Corvis example is particularly revealing in that Ciena
launched a series of lawsuits against Corvis, alleging the latter to engage in unfair
37A third company emerging from the Fiberlane breakup, Cyras, received funding from another
VC ﬁrm. In March 2001, Cyras was acquired by Ciena.
38See various reports at Lightreading.
39See e.g. ONI Systems and Corvis. Other examples include Brio Technology (IPO in May 1998,
6% stake in July 2000), E.piphany (IPO in September 1999, 12% stake in April 2000, 4% stake in
April 2001), and Juniper Networks (IPO in June 1999, 19% stake in April 2000, 8% stake in April
2001). See the companies’ respective proxy ﬁlings.
40Note that our framework does not address why venture capitalists divest stakes in the ﬁrst
place (for example, in an IPO). This would be beyond the scope of the present paper. See Aghion
et al. (2000) for a recent model on exit options in corporate ﬁnance.
23competition.41 Conversely, Corvis faces price pressures from Ciena.42 At the same
time, both Corvis and Ciena are relatively successful players in their respective
market segments. Ciena became a market leader in the market for OEO switches
through its acquisition of Lightera; Corvis is a ﬁrst mover and leader in the market
for all–optical OOO switches.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper demonstrates how strategic substitutabilities between a VC’s portfolio
ﬁrms aﬀect entrepreneurial incentives and venture performance. The analysis sug-
gests that, in some cases, a VC may want to ﬁnance a competing venture in order to
prevent an entrepreneur from seeking ﬁnance elsewhere and to soften her aggressive-
ness. If the VC did not ﬁnance the venture, the entrepreneur would seek ﬁnancing
elsewhere and compete aggressively, eventually. Financing the venture enables the
VC to control the entrepreneur and to align her incentives with his own interests. In
many other cases, however, the VC will rationally back the venture even though the
entrepreneur would have been less aggressive if ﬁnanced by an independent VC. In
other words, the VC willingly cannibalizes his own portfolio ﬁrm. This is because the
stake in the portfolio ﬁrm conveys the VC with a competitive advantage in ﬁnancing
an actual or potential competitor of the portfolio ﬁrm, stemming from his superior
commitment to cut down reﬁnancing. The stake in the portfolio ﬁrm thus serves as
a substitute for collateral.43 In contrast, under independent VC ﬁnancing, a threat
to cut down reﬁnancing lacks credibility as an independent VC has too much to lose
and too little to gain from terminating the venture.
Results depend critically on the strength of the strategic substitutability between
the two ventures. When the negative externality imposed on the portfolio ﬁrm is
very small, then neither is there a reason to soften the entrepreneur’s actions, nor is
there a means to make her work harder. This is because the jointly eﬃcient eﬀort
level is still above the distorted eﬀort level under independent VC ﬁnancing, but
termination threats are not yet eﬀective. If the negative externality imposed on the
VC’s portfolio ﬁrm is neither too small nor too large, then the entrepreneur will
compete more aggressively than under independent VC ﬁnancing. Conversely, if
the strategic substitutability becomes very large, the entrepreneur’s product market
actions will be softened.
The analysis points to a number of novel insights: (i) ﬁnancing a venture that
would compete against a previously launched portfolio ﬁrm can be value–enhancing;
(ii) relative to independent VC ﬁnancing, the venture may perform more aggressively
if backed by the strategic VC as the stake in the previously launched competitor
41See the companies’ respective 2000 10–K reports.
42See Merrill Lynch research report April 27, 2001.
43See, among others, Bergl¨ of and von Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1994), Hart and Moore (1998), and Repullo and Suarez (1998) for discussions
how collateral, security design, and multiple source ﬁnancing allow to strengthen the credibility of
termination threats.
24enhances the VC’s ability to incentivize the venture; (iii) the VC may want to retain a
stake in a portfolio ﬁrm even after the ﬁrm’s IPO in order to enhance his competitive
advantage in ﬁnancing a venture that operates in the same space, addresses similar
needs, and may even become a competitor of the portfolio ﬁrm.
We confronted the analysis with a case study of the investment activities of US
venture capital ﬁrm Kleiner & Perkins in the networking equipment space. The
case study suggests that Kleiner & Perkins backed a competing venture at a time
when it had a substantial but not excessively large stake in a previously funded
portfolio ﬁrm the venture would compete against. This pattern is consistent with
the model’s implications. The case study further suggests that Kleiner & Perkins
frequently retained substantial holdings in a portfolio ﬁrm after the ﬁrm’s IPO.
This is consistent with empirical evidence indicating that VC organizations tend to
continue to be invested in their portfolio ﬁrms (rather than completely divesting their
stakes), even after the expiry of lock–up provisions. We provide a novel explanation
for this pattern. Finally, the case study suggests that Kleiner & Perkins does not
seem to have played a role in softening its portfolio ﬁrms’ performance and hence
their aggressiveness. To the contrary, some of its portfolio ﬁrms became ﬁerce
competitors.
We were mute about the portfolio ﬁrm’s actions. There are two interesting
issues: (i) wouldn’t the portfolio ﬁrm have incentives to buy out the competing
venture? (ii) how are the portfolio ﬁrm’s product market actions aﬀected? As for
the ﬁrst issue, one should note that the ability of the portfolio ﬁrm to buy out the
competing venture is not only hampered by its own ﬁnancial resources but also by
antitrust restrictions. As for the second issue, even the portfolio ﬁrm may very well
be incentivized to act more aggressively. This is because the same logic that explains
why a stake in the portfolio ﬁrm enables the VC to discipline the competing venture
would also explain why a stake in the competing venture allows the VC to discipline
the portfolio ﬁrm.44
There is a complementary explanation for why VCs fund actual or potential
competitors of existing portfolio ﬁrms: Economies of scale. Indeed, VCs often fund
ventures that promise to deliver highly complex products in emerging markets. As-
sisting and coaching these ventures requires technical expertise, industry contacts,
and other assets which are costly to acquire. It is therefore natural that VCs capi-
talize on previously acquired expertise and fund ventures that operate in the same
space, address similar needs, and may even become competitors. Introducing such
economies of scale into our framework model would strengthen the strategic VC’s
incentives to back a competing venture. However, a theory which were based on
economies of scale alone would not allow to explain why VCs retain substantial
holdings in their portfolio ﬁrms after an IPO or the expiry of lock–up periods.
This paper aims at making a contribution towards a deeper understanding of
how the composition of a VC’s investment portfolio and the nature of the strate-
gic interaction between a VC’s portfolio ﬁrms aﬀect performance in venture capital
44See also the discussion in section 4 and footnote 19.
25ﬁnancing.45 While this paper focused on the case of competing ventures, VC or-
ganizations and corporations often ﬁnance ventures that complement their existing
investment portfolios or product lines (as is illustrated by Kleiner & Perkins’ “net-
working supply chain” discussed in section 5). Hellmann (2002) points to the bright
side of such complementarities. He suggests that complementarities can help to
commit a VC to coach a venture. We argue elsewhere that if a venture that brought
strong positive synergies to an investor’s existing portfolio ﬁrms (or product lines)
could be ﬁnanced elsewhere, then the investor might not want to ﬁnance the venture
himself (Arping 2002). This is because, ultimately, the investor might be too hesi-
tant to respond to poor performance with termination as he would lose the strategic
beneﬁts the venture conveys to his existing product lines. As a result, the venture
would have relatively poor incentives to perform. This suggests that a smart VC
would spice up a portfolio of synergistic ﬁrms with ventures that are actual or poten-
tial competitors of these ﬁrms. Such a strategy restores the VC’s incentives to cut
down poorly performing ventures, if needed, and thus improves overall performance.
This seems to be in line with Kleiner & Perkins’ investment strategy.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: In order to complete the proof, we have to show that the ﬁrst best and the
equilibrium eﬀort levels exist and are interior. Consider the ﬁrst best eﬀort level,
Π ¡ Ã
0(e
FB) = 0 (20)
Since lime!0 Ã
0(e) = 0, lime!1 Ã
0(e) ! 1, and Ã
0(e) is continuous and increasing in e, e
FB exists,
is unique and interior.








0(e) = 0 (21)
Note that '(e) is continuous, strictly concave (from Ã
000(e) ¸ 0), and satisﬁes lime!0 '(e) ! ¡1
and lime!1 '(e) ! ¡1. Suppose that a generic solution to '(e) = 0 exists (by assumption, outside
ﬁnancing is feasible), i.e. maxe '(e) > 0. Hence, '(e) = 0 will have exactly two interior solutions.
Since K ¡A+I > 0 and Ã
0(e) is increasing, any such solution will be inferior to the ﬁrst best eﬀort
level. Hence, the optimum is given by the largest solution.
Proof of lemma 1: See the discussion in the text.
Proof of lemma 2 and proposition 2: We will show that as long as the strategic VC breaks even
in equilibrium, a threat to liquidate the venture after a small deviation from the equilibrium eﬀort
level cannot be credible for I ¡ A ¡ e
¤¤∆ > 0 (i.e. ∆ < ∆).
Suppose the entrepreneur expends eﬀort e
¤ in equilibrium. Hence, for the VC to break even,
e
¤(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e
¤)V = V ¡ e
¤¤∆ + I ¡ A + K (22)
28where the right hand side is the VC’s payoﬀ under the outside option, V ¡ e
¤¤∆, plus the VC’s
total investment, I ¡ A + K. Hence,
® =





Suppose a threat to terminate the venture is credible for any e < e
¤. Formally, for any e < e
¤,
e(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e)V ¡ K · V (24)
By continuity,
e
¤(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e
¤)V ¡ K · V (25)
However,
e
¤(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e
¤)V ¡ K = V ¡ e
¤¤∆ + I ¡ A > V (26)
since I ¡ A ¡ e
¤¤∆ > 0. Hence, a termination threat cannot be credible.









0(e) = 0 (27)
Note that e = e
¤¤ is a solution to '(e) = 0. We will show that it is the optimal solution.
Note that '(e) is continuous, strictly concave (from Ã
000(e) ¸ 0), and satisﬁes lime!0 '(e) =
lime!1 '(e) ! ¡1, since I¡A+K¡e
¤¤∆ > 0. Suppose that a generic solution to '(e) = 0 exists,
i.e. maxe '(e) > 0. Hence, '(e) = 0 will have exactly two solutions. Since I¡A+K+(e¡e
¤¤)∆ > 0
and Ã
0(e) is increasing, any such solution will be inferior to the ﬁrst best eﬀort level. Hence, the
optimum is given by the largest solution and, moreover, coincides with the eﬀort level under arm’s
length ﬁnancing, e
¤¤.
Proof of propositions 3 to 5: We will ﬁrst show that if launching the venture is eﬃcient (∆ · ∆
¤),
then the entrepreneur expends ﬁrst best eﬀort and the strategic VC breaks even, provided the
parties employ the ﬁnancial contracts as speciﬁed in propositions 3 and 4.
Case 1, ∆ 2 [∆; ¯ ∆) (proposition 3): Suppose the entrepreneur exerts eﬀort e. Then, in order for
the VC to be willing to close the reﬁnancing gap
e(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e)V ¡ (K ¡ e
¤¤∆ + I ¡ A) ¸ V (28)
where
® =





Note that ®Π > ∆, from K > e
¤¤∆ ¡ (I ¡ A) (or ∆ < ¯ ∆). Hence, substituting (29), (28) reduces
to
e ¸





Conversely, for e < e
FB(∆), the VC is better oﬀ with terminating the venture. Since reﬁnancing
is ex post (strictly) eﬃcient at e
FB, it must be ex post eﬃcient also for some e slightly below e
FB.
For such e, renegotiation is triggered, and the entrepreneur oﬀers the VC a share ®(e) such that
the VC is willing to close the reﬁnancing gap,
e(®(e)Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e)V ¡ (K ¡ e
¤¤∆ + I ¡ A) = V (31)
or
®(e) =




Note that ®(e) is strictly decreasing in e since K > e
¤¤∆¡(I ¡A). The entrepreneur’s payoﬀ from
slightly undercutting e
FB(∆) thus amounts to
e(1 ¡ ®(e))Π ¡ Ã(e) = e(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I + A ¡ K + e
¤¤∆ ¡ Ã(e) (33)
which is maximized at e = e
FB(∆). Hence, around e
FB(∆), the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is maximized
at e
FB(∆), since
(1 ¡ ®)Π = Π ¡ ∆ ¡






29from K > e
¤¤∆ ¡ (I ¡ A) and Π ¡ ∆ = Ã
0(e
FB(∆)). To verify that the entrepreneur is indeed
better oﬀ making the VC an oﬀer to close the reﬁnancing gap if reﬁnancing is eﬃcient (rather than
letting the VC terminate her venture in which case the entrepreneur would consume her internal
funds), note that
e(1 ¡ ®(e))Π = e(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ K + e
¤¤∆ ¡ I + A ¸ e
¤¤∆ ¡ I + A (35)
if and only reﬁnancing is eﬃcient, e(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ K ¸ 0. Suppose the entrepreneur expends an eﬀort
level such that reﬁnancing is ineﬃcient, e(Π + ∆) ¡ K < 0. Hence, the entrepreneur lets the VC
terminate her venture and consumes her internal funds e
¤¤∆ ¡ I + A. If this were optimal for the
entrepreneur, she would expend zero eﬀort. The entrepreneur does not hold up the VC by exerting
zero eﬀort if and only if
e
FB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I + A ¡ K + e
¤¤∆ ¡ Ã(e
FB(∆)) ¸ e
¤¤∆ ¡ I + A (36)
which holds since launching the venture is eﬃcient, e
FB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ K ¡ I ¡ Ã(e
FB(∆)) ¸ 0.
Finally, note that the VC just breaks even, since
e
FB(∆)(®Π + V ¡ ∆) + (1 ¡ e
FB(∆))V ¡ I + A ¡ K = V ¡ e
¤¤∆ (37)
Hence, the contract is optimal.
Case 2, ∆ 2 [¯ ∆;∆
¤) (proposition 4): Note that the entrepreneur’s cash balance at t = 2 is suﬃcient
as to self–reﬁnance her venture, e
¤¤∆ ¡ (I ¡ A) ¸ K. Suppose the entrepreneur exerts eﬀort such
that reﬁnancing her venture is optimal for her. Her payoﬀ function thus amounts to
e(Π ¡ ∆) + e
¤¤∆ ¡ I + A ¡ K ¡ Ã(e) (38)
which is maximized at e
FB(∆). Alternatively, she could refrain from working, in which case she
would be left with her internal funds A¡I +e
¤¤∆. Again, the entrepreneur has no interest to hold
up the VC since launching the venture is eﬃcient. Finally, note that the VC breaks even, since
e
FB(∆)(V ¡ ∆ + ∆) + (1 ¡ e
FB(∆))V ¡ e
¤¤∆ = V ¡ e
¤¤∆ (39)
Hence, the contract is optimal.
We conclude that if the venture is launched, then the entrepreneur expends ﬁrst best eﬀort, resulting
in an ex ante payoﬀ of
e
FB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I + A ¡ K + e
¤¤∆ ¡ Ã(e
FB(∆)) (40)
If launching the venture is not eﬃcient then, obviously, the entrepreneur is bought out by the VC
against a payment T = e
¤¤∆, resulting in an ex ante payoﬀ of e
¤¤∆ + A (proposition 5).
We will now argue that the entrepreneur is better oﬀ being ﬁnanced (or bought out) by the
strategic VC than being ﬁnanced by an independent investor. Suppose ﬁrst that launching the
venture is eﬃcient. Then, the entrepreneur will be strictly better oﬀ with the VC if her payoﬀ
under venturing by the VC strictly exceeds her payoﬀ under independent venturing,
e
¤¤Π ¡ I + A ¡ K ¡ Ã(e
¤¤) (41)
By inspection, (40) strictly exceeds (41) if
e
FB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ Ã(e
FB(∆)) > e
¤¤(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ Ã(e
¤¤) (42)
which, from concavity and ∆ > 0, holds by revealed preference. Next, if launching the venture is
ineﬃcient, the entrepreneur will be strictly better oﬀ with the VC if
A > e
¤¤(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I + A ¡ K ¡ Ã(e
¤¤) (43)
which holds again since
e
¤¤(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e
¤¤) < e
FB(∆)(Π ¡ ∆) ¡ I ¡ K ¡ Ã(e
FB(∆)) < 0 (44)
by revealed preference. To conclude, for ∆ 2 [∆;∆
¤], the venture will be launched and the en-
trepreneur will expend ﬁrst best eﬀort. For ∆ > ∆
¤, the venture will be acquired by the VC.
Proof of proposition 6: See the discussion in the text.
30